JUVENILE LAW-EQAL PROTECTION FOR JUVENILES IN THE POSTADJUDICATIVE PROCESs-In re Brown (3rd Cir. 1971).
In September, 1968, Kenneth Brown, a fourteen year old juvenile,
was taken into custody by Virgin Islands police and charged with
the theft of twelve dollars. At his trial before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Division of the Municipal Court of the Virgin
Islands, defense counsel moved for a dismissal, arguing that Brown
had not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The motion was denied, and Brown was found guilty by the trial judge.
He was committed to the custody of the Virgin Islands Department
of Social Welfare until his eighteenth birthday.
After sentencing, Brown petitioned the district court for leave
to appeal, pursuant to a statute authorizing appeals in juvenile
cases only at the discretion of the district court.' The petition asserted that his conviction had been obtained on inadequate evidence, and that certain admissions had been obtained in violation of
his fifth amendment rights.2 Although the petition raised claims
involving substantial rights, the district court denied leave to appeal without comment. Appeal from the order of the district court
was then taken to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Before the Third Circuit, Brown argued (1) that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his petition for leave to appeal, and
(2) that 4 V.I. Code § 333 violates the Bill of Rights in that its provisions for discretionary appeal in juvenile cases deny equal protection of law to juveniles.
By a strong majority, 4 the Third Circuit preemptorily dismissed
consideration of the claim of abuse of discretion, and proceeded to
1. 4 V.I. CODE ANN. § 33 (1957) provides:
The district court has appellate jurisdiction to review the judgments and orders of the Municipal Court in all civil cases . . . in

all juvenile and domestic relations cases, and in all criminal cases
in which the defendant has been convicted, other than on a plea of
guilty.

Appeals in civil, juvenile and domestic relations cases

may be taken by the party aggrieved by the judgment or order

appealed from, but in juvenile and domestic relations cases they
may be taken only if specially allowed by the district court....

2. The Bill of Rights is made applicable to the Virgin Islands by 48
U.S.C. § 1406g (1936).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. Only one of seven justices dissented.
February 1972 Vol. 9 No. 2

decide the case upon the constitutional issue of denial of equal protection. The court held that where an absolute right of appeal is
afforded adults in criminal cases, equal protection of law requires
that it also be afforded to juveniles in all cases in which the lower
court decision imposes a restraint on the juvenile's liberty. To the
extent that it made appeal discretionary in such cases, 4 V.I. Code
§ 33 was invalidated. 5
The Brown holding is significant, since the United States Supreme
Court has not yet dealt with the issue of the post-adjudicative rights
of juveniles. However, the Third Circuit's decision to exercise jurisdiction on the constitutional issue bears equally close examination.
The court's approach, as well as the decision and its implications,
is considered below.
Brown's appeal urged reversal of the district court on alternative
theories, abuse of discretion and denial of equal protection. The
first theory would have permitted the court to decide the case
through statutory interpretation, avoiding the constitutional issue
of equal protection. Such an approach would have been in accord
with long-standing precedent. Federal courts have traditionally refused to consider the constitutionality of a statute when it may
reasonably be construed in such a manner as to avoid the constitutional question. Similarly, where a state ground for decision is
present, the alternative constitutional ground has been avoided."
After making reference to the traditional principles of avoidance
of constitutional questions, the Third Circuit went on to state that
the Brown case raised "considerations which compel a decision
even if the issue is treated as a constitutional one. ' 7 Where other
federal courts have elected to decide a constitutional question which
might have been avoided, over-riding public policy considerations
have generally been cited.s Such considerations could no doubt
have been found in Brown's appeal. However, the Third Circuit
did not outline them. Rather, it attempted to ground its exercise
of jurisdiction on practical considerations of judicial administration. 9
The court pointed out that a decision on abuse of discretion would
5. 439 F.2d 47, 54 (3rd Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
6. A clear exposition of these principles is provided in the concurring
opinion of Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936).
7. 439 F.2d at 51.
8. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), where the importance of the constitutional issue in a civil rights case was found to warrant extraordinary federal injunctive relief, although abstention from deciding the case would have been the normal procedure.
9. 439 F.2d at 51.
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require remand to the district court, since that court set forth no
reasons for denying leave to appeal. The case would merely return after some delay. The Third Circuit also took judicial notice

that abuse of discretion was a recurrent claim.
court proceeded in a novel direction.

So stating, the

' * * [T] he District Court should not continue to engage in the delicate and often difficult function of exercising its discretion if such
appeals are as of right and it has no discretion to deny them. Its
function would be derangedif it were overhung by the threat of invalidity of the statutory provision. .... For these important practical considerations, which affect the proper administration of justice and in the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction over the
Islands, we consider the validity of the statucourts of the Virgin
tory provision.'0
Statutes have often been challenged on constitutional grounds.

Yet it has seldom been suggested in a narrow sense that constitutional challenges, if undecided, risk injury to the functioning of
the judicial system. That a statute may eventually be invalidated
has seldom, if ever, been viewed as affecting the operations of the
particular lower courts which must apply it. However, when ex-

tended to its logical conclusion, the argument is not without precedent. A policy of consistent avoidance of constitutional issues by
the federal courts may ultimately result in undermining public confidence in the judiciary, and in dislocating the system of balance of

powers. It was fear of the latter which led Chief Justice Marshall,
in 1821, to urge that the Supreme Court not avoid constitutional
questions properly within its jurisdiction."
While there is a danger in avoiding constitutional issues, the
Third Circuit did not direct its remarks toward identifying this
danger as a consideration in its decision to decide the equal protection question. The argument which it made differed fundamentally from that made by Marshall. It reasoned that decision of the
equal protection challenge to 4 V.I. Code § 33 was not only in the
interests of the administration of justice, but was itself an exercise
of its supervisory jurisdiction over the lower court.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6

Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).

In claiming to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction, the Third Cir-

cuit left precedent behind. To reason that a state or territorial law
is to be invalidated in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction over
the courts is to stretch the concept of supervisory jurisdiction almost beyond recognition. 12 It is regrettable that this reasoning was
employed, for it raises the suspicion that the real reason for deciding
the constitutional issue may have been irritation at repeated insensitive and inappropriate dismissals of juvenile appeals by the district court.
Brown's second theory asserted that where absolute right of appellate review is granted to adults by statute, it is a denial of equal
protection of law to deprive juveniles of the same right. In vacating
the district court's dismissal of his appeal and remanding for a hearing, the Third Circuit did not adopt Brown's position in toto. Juveniles were held to have an absolute right to appeal only where
the lower court's decision imposes a restraint on their liberty. 13
The limitation of the appellate rights of juveniles to cases resulting in loss of liberty resulted from the approach taken by the court.
Lacking direct precedent upon which to base its decision, 14 the
Third Circuit chose to adopt the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois.'5 After noting with obvious disapproval 16 that the right to appellate review is not required by the
concept of due process of law,1 7 the court stated that once review is
18
granted, it may not be limited in a discriminatory manner.
In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that appellate procedures
which discriminate against the poor are arbitrary and invidious,
12. See, e.g., Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in
which the supervisory jurisdiction of the court of appeals was invoked to
require District of Columbia courts to provide stenographic recordation of
preliminary examinations.
13. 439 F.2d at 53-54.
14. There are a few federal cases dealing with the issue raised in Brown.
One early case is Ex parte Januszewski, 196 F. 123 (S.D. Ohio 1911). There
it was held that a federal court has no power to invalidate a state juvenile
court act for its failure to provide for appeals by juveniles, since no
right to appeal exists in any case unless conferred by statute. The matter was found to be within the sole power of the states. The case is distinguishable from Brown, however, since in the latter, some provisions
for review of juvenile decisions existed, while in the former, no provisions
for review had been created.
15. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Griffin]. The case dealt
with the post-adjudicative rights of adults. It held that equal protection
requires the states to provide free transcripts to indigent defendants where
necessary to enable appeal.
16. 439 F.2d at 51.

17. Id. The court cited McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1893).
18. Id.
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and are therefore in violation of the equal protection clause. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter reasoned that equal protection does not prevent a state from creating classes of appellate
rights, as long as the differentiation is based on reasonable and appropriate distinctions in crimes and punishments. 19 Proceeding
by analogy to Griffin, the Third Circuit adopted Frankfurter's view,
and undertook examination of the differentiation between adult
and juvenile appellate rights imposed by 4 V.T. Code § 33.
The once "progressive" view of juvenile proceedings-now the
orthodox approach-is
that their purpose is "salutory" rather than
"punitive". 20 On the theory that lack of formal procedures will
best protect the real interests of the child, the courts have often resisted according juveniles in delinquency proceedings the rights
granted adults in criminal proceedings. The proposition that delinquency hearings are civil, not criminal in nature, 21 originally designed to prevent future stigmatization of the juvenile, has been
employed to buttress the argument that the constitutional safeguards applied to adults in criminal cases have no place in the ju22
venile courts.
Rejecting the thinking of the "progressive" school, the Third Circuit found that there is no necessary conflict between the desire for
a flexible approach to juvenile cases and the availability of procedural safeguards, including the right to appellate review. After
commenting that In re Gault 28 expressed the Supreme Court's concern to prevent juvenile proceedings from becoming arbitrary and
capricious, the Third Circuit went a step beyond that decision.
The informality and flexibility of the juvenile adjudication and
the subsequent treatment make the right of appeal perhaps more,
and certainly not less, vital to safeguard those subject to the juvenile process .... 24
On such a rationale, the court might well have found no reasonable basis for differentiation between juvenile and adult proceedings. However, it stopped somewhere short of that position. The
19. 351 U.S. at 21-22.
20. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gault].
21. Id. at 17.
22. This view is expressed by the sole dissenting justice in Brown.
See, opinion of Ganey, C.J., 439 F.2d at 55.
23. See note 20 supra.
24. 439 F.2d at 52.

court concluded that a difference could still be found. It lay, not
itself, but in the varying dispositions of
in the adjudicative process
25
juvenile and adult cases.

A juvenile court may, and in Brown's case did, order institutional
confinement. It may also impose conditions of probation or devise
other rehabilitative measures. 2 6 The Third Circuit addressed itself to this point.
If the ultimate result of [the juvenile court's] decree is the loss
of the juvenile's liberty ...

the result is realistically the same as

27
that which would follow from a declaration of criminality.

Where juvenile court orders did not result in loss of liberty, the
Third Circuit felt that the same need for protection from the effects
of unreasonably harsh dispositions did not exist. Thus, dispositions
were found to constitute a rational ground for differentiation of
juvenile appeal rights. The court held that to deny an absolute
right of appeal to juveniles who are deprived of their liberty is arbitrary, and therefore in violation of equal protection of law. The
rights of juveniles not deprived of their liberty were not to be affected by the ruling.
Justice Ganey, the sole dissenter from the majority opinion,
pointed out a practical problem raised by the Brown decision. 28 In
conditioning the right to appeal upon deprivation of liberty, the
court made no attempt to define those conditions it considered to
constitute a deprivation of liberty. Arguably, the court did not intend to extend the holding beyond the precise facts of Brown's
case, that is, confinement to an institution. Yet it can also be argued that probation may constitute as real and complete a deprivation of liberty as physical confinement. In any event, probation
may be subject to revocation. The scope of the Brown decision is
therefore unclear.

29

The logic of the Third Circuit in arriving at less than an absolute
right to appeal in all juvenile cases is open to criticism. The court,
25. Id. at 53.
26. 5 V.I. CODE ANN. § 2506(3) (1957) states:

(3) [The court may] order such other care and treatment as
the court may deem best....
27. 439 F.2d at 53.
28. Id. at 55.

29. The identical problem arose in Pennsylvania under section 15 of
the Juvenile Court Act, 11 PA. STAT. ANN. § 257 (Purdon 1965), which
provides for review as of right of final orders committing or placing a juvenile. In Appeal of Moore, 217 Pa. Super. 206, 269 A.2d 395 (1970), it was
held that an order of probation was included in the mandatory review
provisions of the statute, since probation constitutes a restriction of the
civil liberty of the juvenile.
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dealing with a delinquency case, found that different dispositions
may justify the creation of different appellate rights in juvenile
cases. While it is true that juvenile delinquency proceedings need
not result in institutional commitment, it is equally true that adult
criminal proceedings may have results other than imprisonment.
Probation may be granted, a fine imposed, or in some jurisdictions
more flexible work-furlough programs instituted. The distinctions
between adult criminal dispositions and juvenile delinquency dispositions are arguably minimal. Yet in all criminal cases, the right
of adults to appellate review is absolute.
In deciding Brown, it was unnecessary for the Third Circuit to
rule on the appellate rights of juveniles brought before the courts
in guardianship or other protective proceedings in which no violation of the criminal law is alleged. However, the court did comment
on such cases in dicta. 30 Under the relevant Virgin Islands statute,
commitment could be ordered in both delinquency and custodial
proceedings. 31 As a result of the court's focus on dispositions, it
was unavoidable that no distinction could be drawn between juvenile appellate rights in delinquency cases and other cases arising
under juvenile law. Thus, if any juvenile case results in deprivation of liberty, the right to appellate review is unlimited.
A second result of the Brown court's decision to examine the nature of juvenile dispositions rather than the nature of the proceedings was avoidance of a potential difficulty in applying equal protection to juveniles. Under all juvenile statutes, a child may be
taken into custody for acts which would not constitute a crime if
committed by an adult.32 Likewise, a neglected child who is en33
There are no
dangered may be brought before a juvenile court.
parallel provisions applicable to adults, with the possible exception
of statutes permitting the involuntary commitment of the mentally
ill. Had the Third Circuit chosen to differentiate juvenile and adult
appeal rights according to the nature of either the offense or the
proceeding itself, a logically untenable demarcation would have resulted. Those juveniles violating a criminal law would have been
guaranteed the right to appeal, since comparable adult offenses
30. 439 F.2d at 53.
31. 5 V.I. CODE ANN. § 2506 (1957).
32. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE § 601 (West 1971).
33. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INsT'N CODE § 600 (West 1971).

exist. Those juveniles found to be endangered by inadequate supervision would have been denied appeal as of right, since no comparable adult offense or legal status exists. The latter class of juveniles would have been subject to arbitrary dispositions without
benefit of appellate safeguards. The purpose of appellate review,
avoidance of unreasonably harsh and arbitrary dispositions, would
have been defeated.
It was this concern with the purposes of appellate review which
led the Brown court to base its decision on examination of juvenile
dispositions. The court sought to prevent unreasonable restraint of
the juvenile's liberty. It reasoned that the unstructured nature of
the juvenile court may enable more individualized and humane
treatment of young offenders. However, it may also enable unjust
treatment of the children brought before it. The appeal mechanism
was seen as necessary to avoid substantial harm to the children
whose interests the juvenile courts were designed to protect.
The fault of the Third Circuit's thinking on the function of juvenile appeals is that it does not go far enough. The danger of an
overly flexible and uncontrolled adjudicative process was cited by
the court. Such a danger would appear to call for clear and unqualified espousal of the principle of an absolute right to appellate
review of juvenile cases. If review is to prevent arbitrary dispositions and their accompanying harm, appeal as of right from all juvenile cases would appear to be an essential, and even a minimal,
safeguard.
Despite the criticisms which may be directed at the majority opinion in Brown, the Third Circuit's reasoning on the equal protection
issue deserves favorable attention. The court decided Brown's case
on the assumption that juveniles are entitled to equal protection of
law. That principle itself was not questioned. As due process of
law was not finally held applicable to juveniles until 1967,84 that assumption is significant. The willingness of the court to follow the
lead of the Supreme Court in Gault3 5 and Winship8H by "piercing
the veil" of juvenile proceedings in order to examine their effects,
37
rather than their theories, is likewise significant.
34. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. Id.
36. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

37. Many state courts continue to recite the orthodox view of juvenile
court systems. See, e.g., In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 519-20, 468 P.2d 204,
207, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76, 79 (1970):
[I]n adult criminal prosecutions a major goal is corrective confinement of the defendant for the protection of society. But even
after Gault, ... juvenile proceedings retain a sui generis character: although certain basic rules of due process must be ob-
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While the precise holding of Brown appears to be of direct precedential value in few jurisdictions, 38 the reasoning which led the
Third Circuit to find a violation of equal protection of law in the
area of appellate procedure might well be applied in the future to
other areas of juvenile law. Such areas might include substantive as well as procedural provisions of the law. The Brown case
itself suggests as a possible starting point those statutes which permit incarceration of juveniles until majority. As the Third Circuit
noted, the original disposition in Brown's case was institutional confinement until age eighteen, a period of almost four years. 39 An
adult convicted of the same offense, petty larceny,
could have re40
ceived a maximum sentence of one year in prison.
Recognizing that juvenile institutions are frequently rehabilitative
in name only, it would appear that reassessment of existing juvenile law is in order. If, in reality, the operation of juvenile insitutions is merely punitive, there is little reason for failure to apply the equal protection clause to juvenile dispositions themselves.
Longer terms of confinement for juveniles than for adults can be
justified, if at all, on the theory that the young offender will somehow be benefited. If the benefit of institutionalization is more
illusory than real, then it is unconscionable that a juvenile should
pay a higher price than an adult for the same offense. Equal protection of law should forbid such groundless discrimination in penserved, the proceedings are nevertheless conducted for the protection and benefit of the youth in question (citations omitted).
But see, In re Mlikkelsen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 471, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108
(1964); In Te Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952):
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a
minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a
legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason.
38. While at one time several states had statutes which allowed only
discretionary appeal in juvenile cases, most have now provided appeal as
of right. See ARiz. REV. STATs. § 8-236, added in 1970 to permit appeal
from final orders of the juvenile court as from any other final order. An
example of a state which at present does not permit appeal from juvenile
court orders is Washington. There, decisions in juvenile cases are reviewable only by certiorari. REV. CODE OF WASH. RuLES ON APPEAL § 57 (b)
(3) (1963). As a petition for writ of certiorari may be denied in the discretion of the court, a violation of equal protection might be found in such
a statute.
39. 439 F.2d at 52.
40. 14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 1084 (1957).

alties. It is to be hoped that the realistic approach to juvenile law
taken by the Third Circuit will be extended.
PATRICIA
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